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Negotiated rulemaking, sometimes referred to as regulatory
negotiation or "reg-neg," emerged in the 1980s as an alternative
to traditional procedures for drafting proposed regulations.' The
essence of the idea is simple: in certain situations, it is valuable
to bring together representatives of the responsible agency and
the stakeholders to jointly prepare the text of a proposed rule
before the agency submits the rule to the formal rulemaking
process.
In the traditional draft-notice-comment approach to
administrative rulemaking, the agency may or may not consult
people whose activities are regulated, or who might otherwise be
interested in the issue, to gather information that may be
helpful in drafting the proposed rule. And when an agency does
seek the input and advice of stakeholders during the process of
drafting a rule, it typically consults with one stakeholder at a
time. Such contacts are usually informal and unstructured. In
short, traditional rulemaking procedures do not necessarily
encourage the agency and all affected parties to sit down face-to-
face and exchange ideas in an effort to reach agreement prior to
drafting the proposed rule.
Negotiated rulemaking, by contrast, provides an
opportunity for all stakeholders and the responsible agency to
work together to draft a proposed rule. In some situations,
additional negotiations among the agency and the stakeholders
may be useful after the formal public comment period and
during implementation of the rule. By allowing the agency and
all affected interests to jointly frame the issues and search for
mutually agreeable solutions, negotiated rulemaking is
supposed to increase citizen participation in public decision
making; improve the substance of a proposed rule; shorten the
length of time necessary to implement a final rule; increase the
level of compliance; and reduce litigation. In theory, it can also
foster cooperative working relationships among the agency and
stakeholders.
However, this process can be resource-intensive in the
1. See generally PHILIP J. HARTER, NEGOTIATING REGULATIONS: A CURE FOR THE
MALAISE (1982) (detailing the history of the idea of negotiated rulemaking). See also
Lawrence Susskind & Gerald McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1985); DAVID M. PRITZKER & DEBORAH S. DALTON,
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK (Administrative Conference of the United
States, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995); Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus:
The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997); and
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short-term for both the agency and other participants. The
agency may be compelled to retain a convener or facilitator to
manage the process. The stakeholders may have to spend more
time and resources with the agency before, during, and after the
public comment period. A negotiated rulemaking process also
requires the participants to review additional documents and
generate ideas, proposals, and perhaps data-all of which takes
time. While these short-term costs should not be ignored,
proponents of negotiated rulemaking argue that it is important
to focus on the long-term benefits that accrue through the
process.
Negotiated rulemaking seems to hold much promise, at
least in theory. However, it is not widely used at federal or state
levels for a number of reasons. The purpose of this article is to
examine the disparity between the theory and practice of
negotiated rulemaking in Montana, and to offer some
suggestions toward improving citizen participation through
negotiated rulemaking.
I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The idea of negotiated rulemaking emerged in 1982 with the
hope of decreasing the amount of time it takes to develop
regulations, improving the substance and acceptability of
proposed rules, and reducing or eliminating subsequent judicial
challenges. 2 In that year, the Administrative Conference of the
United States published a recommended framework for
negotiated rulemaking at the federal level.3 The Conference was
quick to point out that the recommendations were not
mandatory, but simply provided a starting point for agencies to
apply the concept of reg-neg to their own situations. The
recommendations included criteria to identify rulemaking
situations in which reg-neg is likely to be useful. These criteria
were designed to help federal agencies determine when
negotiated rulemaking may be appropriate. The Conference also
suggested specific procedures to follow when using negotiated
2. See generally HARTER, supra note 1. Philip J. Harter is widely recognized as
one of the key architects of the theory of negotiated rulemaking. He is also an
experienced practitioner, having designed and managed a number of reg-negs.
3. See Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation 82-4, in
Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1998). See
generally HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING BEFORE FEDERAL
AGENCIES: EVALUATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES (1986).
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rulemaking. These recommendations were refined in 1985
based on initial agency experiences. 4
In 1983, the Federal Aviation Administration became the
first federal agency to try negotiated rulemaking.5 The FAA
convened a committee to negotiate a revision of rules governing
flight and rest time for domestic airline pilots. The committee
included representatives of airlines, pilot organizations, public
interest groups, and other concerned people. The prior rules
were in effect for 30 years, an interval of substantial change in
the airline industry, and the FAA issued more than 1,000
interpretations of the rules. On a number of occasions, the
agency proposed revisions to rules which were subsequently
withdrawn due to opposition. The 1983 negotiated rulemaking
process resulted in a final rule, which was adopted in 1985 and
not challenged in court. Since then several agencies within the
U.S. Department of Transportation have used reg-neg on a
variety of issues.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has been the
most consistent and committed user of negotiated rulemaking at
the federal level, accounting for about one-third of federal reg-
negs. 6 The EPA has relied on negotiated rulemaking to achieve
consensus on rules dealing with penalties for manufacturers of
vehicles not meeting Clean Air Act standards, emergency
exemptions from pesticide regulations, performance standards
for woodburning stoves, control of volatile organic chemical
equipment leaks, national emission standards for coke ovens,
manifests for transporting hazardous wastes, and chemicals
used in manufacturing wood furniture. In several other
situations, the EPA promulgated administrative rules on the
results of negotiations when participants were unable to agree
completely on a proposal.
Other federal agencies that have used negotiated
rulemaking include the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Farm
Credit Administration, Federal Communications Commission,
Federal Trade Commission, and the departments of Agriculture,
4. See Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation 85-5, in
Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5 (1998).
5. See generally PRITZKER & DALTON, supra note 1.
6. See HARTER, supra note 1, at 9. Harter further suggests that the Department
of Transportation has actually engaged in more negotiated rulemaking proceedings,
largely because the EPA has not used the process during the Clinton Administration.
Personal communication with Phillip J. Harter (April 8, 1999).
502 Vol. 60
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Education, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban
Development, and the Interior. According to a comprehensive
assessment at the federal level, 67 negotiations were convened
from 1983 through 1996.7 Of the total, 13, or nearly 20 percent,
were abandoned by the agency before any consensus emerged.
Nineteen of the rulemakings remained pending in 1996, with a
final rule yet to be issued. Since 1983, when the FAA initiated
the first negotiated rulemaking, federal agencies have
promulgated only 35 rules using this procedure, or less than 1
percent of all administrative rules promulgated by the federal
government during the same time period.8
The theory of negotiated rulemaking was formalized at the
federal level in 1990 with the enactment of the Negotiated
Rulemaking Act.9  The Act, which was permanently
reauthorized in 1996,10 establishes the basic statutory
requirements for the use of reg-neg, but allows for great
flexibility and encourages experimentation and innovation by
federal agencies. The Act emphasizes the value of effective
communication with -people affected by or interested in a
proposed rule, adequate opportunity for public participation,
and openness of the entire process.
Following the trend at the federal level, the legislatures in
Idaho," Florida, 12  Montana, 13  Nebraska, 14  Texas, 15  and
Washington 16  passed statutes encouraging negotiated
7. See Coglianese, supra note 1, at 1256.
8. The question of how successful negotiated rulemaking is at the federal level is
open for debate. For a critical reply to Coglianese's work, see Philip J. Harter, Fear of
Commitment: An Affliction of Adolescents, 46 DUKE L.J. 1389 (1997); see also Philip J.
Harter, The Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response to Professor
Coglianese (unpublished draft article on file with the author).
9. See Public Law No 101-648 (1990), 5 U.S.C. § 561-570 (1998).
10. See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, §
11(a), 110 Stat. 3870, 3873 (1997).
11. See IDAHO CODE §§ 67-5206 - 67-5232 (1998).
12. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.54 (2)(d)(1) (West 1998).
13. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-5-102-110 (1997).
14. See NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 84-921-932 (Michie 1998).
15. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-2008 (West 1997). As of 1988, negotiated
rulemaking has been used three times in Texas. The first use was sponsored by the
General Land Office to formulate oil spill damage assessment rules. The second was
initiated by the Comptroller to design a new timberland tax appraisal manual. And the
latest involved regulation of nursing home Medicaid beds by the Department of Human
Services. Each one of these proceedings resulted in a consensus proposal.
16. See WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05 (1998). See also Executive Order Improving
State Regulatory Activities (EO 93-06) and Executive Order on Regulatory Reform (EO
94-07). See also WASHINGTON STATE OFFICE OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, A GUIDE TO
1999 503
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rulemaking. 17 The Governor of New York issued an executive
order establishing a negotiated rulemaking program in 1992.18
The legislatures in New York and Pennsylvania considered bills
in the past to authorize the use of negotiated rulemaking. 19
However, apparently there has yet to be any systematic
documentation or analysis of implementing negotiated
rulemaking at the state level. 20
II. THE THEORY IN MONTANA
A. Constitutional and Statutory Framework
The Montana Constitution states that "The public has the
right to expect governmental agencies to afford such reasonable
opportunity for citizen participation in the operation of the
agencies prior to the final decision as may be provided by law."2'
Section 2-3-101 of Montana Code Annotated (MCA) provides
legislative guidelines to implement this constitutional right.
This section, referred to as the Public Participation in
Governmental Operations Act, states that each agency shall
develop procedures for permitting and encouraging the public to
participate in agency decisions that are of significant interest to
the public. The procedures ensure adequate notice and provide
for public participation before a final agency action is taken that
is of significant interest to the public.
The promulgation of administrative rules in Montana is
further governed by the Montana Administrative Procedure Act
(MAPA).22 Taken together, the public participation act and
MAPA require agencies to facilitate citizen participation in
rulemaking through the following steps:
(1) provide written public notice of the intended action
PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN RULE MAKING (February 1995).
17. For more information about state involvement in negotiated rulemaking, see
CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PUBLIC RESOURCE SERIES NUMBER
THREE, COMMENTARY ON THE GOVERNMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT AND THE
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING ACT (September 1998).
18. See State of New York Exec. Order No. 156 (June 8, 1992).
19. See WASHINGTON STATE OFFICE OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, A GUIDE TO
PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN RULE MAKING at 3 (February 1995).
20. The Policy Consensus Initiative [PCI], a national organization dedicated to
promoting consensus approaches to public policy, is currently conducting research into
the use of negotiated rulemaking in states. It has not published findings as of the date of
this publication. For an update on this research, PCI can be reached at (505) 984-8211.
21. See Mont. Const. Art. II, § 8.
22. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-101 (1997).
Vol. 60504
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prior to the adoption, amendment, or repeal of any rule;23
(2) conduct a public hearing after appropriate notice;24 and
(3) allow citizens to submit data, views, or arguments,
orally or in written form, prior to making a final decision.
B. Exceptions
These requirements do not apply to an agency decision that
must be made to deal with an emergency situation affecting
public health, welfare, or safety; an agency decision that must be
made to maintain or protect the interests of the agency,
including but not limited to the filing of a lawsuit in a court of
law or becoming a party to an administrative proceeding; or a
decision involving no more than a ministerial act.25
C. Informal Consultations
Section 2-4-304, of the MCA provides additional guidance to
agencies to engage citizens in the process of drafting
administrative rules.26 According to this provision, "An agency
may use informal conferences and consultations as a means of
obtaining the viewpoints and advice of interested persons with
respect to contemplated rulemaking."27 The statute explains
that an agency "may also appoint committees of experts or
interested persons or representatives of the general public to
advise it with respect to any contemplated rulemaking .... [but
the] powers of the committees shall be advisory only."28 As
explained below, state agencies have used this provision to
involve citizens and stakeholders in a variety of ways in the
administrative rulemaking process.
D. The Montana Negotiated Rulemaking Act
The Montana Negotiated Rulemaking Act was passed in
1993 and is modeled after its federal equivalent. 29 The purpose
of the Montana act is "to establish a framework for the conduct
of negotiated rulemaking consistent with the Montana
23. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-302(1) (1997).
24. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-104(3) (1997).
25. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-112 (1997).
26. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-304 (1997).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-5-101 (1997).
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Administrative Procedure Act and the constitutional right of
Montanans to participate in the operation of governmental
agencies .... -130 In other words, the act is designed to
supplement, not replace, the existing constitutional and
statutory framework for citizen participation in administrative
rulemaking. It encourages agencies to use negotiated
rulemaking to resolve controversial issues prior to initiating the
formal rulemaking process. The act is not a substitute for the
public notification and participation requirements of MAPA. 31
The procedures in the act are not mandatory; they are simply
advisory, and agencies and citizens are encouraged to
experiment with different approaches to their implementation.
To initiate a negotiated rulemaking process, an agency
director must determine that the procedure is "in the public
interest."32 In making such a determination, the agency director
is encouraged to consider a number of practical issues, such as
the need for the rule, the ability to identify stakeholders and
convene a balanced committee, the likelihood of reaching
consensus, the availability of resources, and the willingness of
the agency to use a consensus recommendation of the
committee. 33 An agency may use the services of a convener or
facilitator to determine the appropriateness of using a
negotiated rulemaking committee,34 and, subject to the approval
of the entire committee, to coordinate the negotiated rulemaking
process. 35
If an agency proposes to create a negotiated rulemaking
committee, it must publish a notice in the Montana
Administrative Register and appropriate newspapers and other
publications to explain its intentions; the subject and scope of
the rule to be developed; a list of interests likely to be affected by
the proposed rule; a list of people proposed to represent the
various interests, including the agency; a proposed schedule;
and how a person may apply for or nominate another person for
membership on the committee.36 An agency may include the
notice of intent to create a negotiated rulemaking committee in
the notice of intent to promulgate rules pursuant to Section 2-4-
30. Id.
31. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-5-102 (1997).
32. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-5-104 (1997).
33. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-5-104 (1) (1997).
34. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-5-104 (2) (1997).
35. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-5-109 and 110 (1997).
36. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-5-105 (1997).
506 Vol. 60
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302, MCA, and must allow at least 30 days for people to respond
with comments and applications for membership.
The agency may or may not decide to form a committee
based on the results of the public notice. If the agency moves to
create such a committee, it must provide administrative and
technical support to the committee. 37 The committee terminates
upon adopting the final rule under consideration, unless the
participants agree to an earlier termination date. If the agency
decides not to create a negotiated rulemaking committee, it
notifies the people who commented on or applied for
membership on the committee and explain the reasons for the
decision. 38
Once a negotiated rulemaking committee is formed, it may
expand its membership by consensus. 39 The committee itself
may recruit additional people or organizations believed to be
essential to the project's success. In addition, people who will be
significantly affected by a proposed rule, or who believe that
their interests will not be adequately represented by any person
on the committee, may petition or nominate another person for
membership.40 Upon receiving such a petition, the committee
decides by consensus at its next meeting whether or not to
expand its membership. 41 Agency officials "shall participate in
the deliberations of the committee with the same rights and
responsibilities of other members of the committee" and should
be "authorized to fully represent the agency in the discussions
and negotiations of the committee."42
The negotiated rulemaking committee may adopt
procedures or ground rules to govern the proceeding.43  It
considers the issue proposed by the agency and attempts to
reach consensus concerning the proposed rule and any other
matter it determines is relevant to the proposed rule.44
Consensus is defined as "unanimous concurrence among the
interests represented on a negotiated rulemaking committee...
unless the committee agrees upon another specified definition."45
37. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-5-106 (1997).
38. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-5-106(2) (1997).
39. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-5-107(1) (1997).
40. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-5-107(2) (1997).
41. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-5-107(3) (1997).
42. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-5-108(2) (1997).
43. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-5-108(3) (1997).
44. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-5-108(1) (1997).
45. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-5-103(2) (1997).
1999 507
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If a committee achieves consensus on a proposed rule, it
must submit a report that includes the proposed rule to the
agency that established the committee. 46 If the committee does
not reach a consensus, it is encouraged to submit a report to the
agency that specifies areas of agreement and clarifies the issues
remaining unresolved. 47 The committee may include in the
report any other information, recommendations, or materials
considered appropriate. Any individual member of the
committee may include additional material as an addendum to
the report.
III. THE PRACTICE IN MONTANA: RESULTS OF A SURVEY
In July 1998, the Montana Consensus Council distributed a
survey to 21 state agencies in Montana.48 The intent of the
survey was to evaluate Montana's experience with the use of
negotiated rulemaking since the Montana Negotiated
Rulemaking Act took effect in October 1993.
Nineteen agencies returned a completed survey, for a
response rate of 90 percent. Based on these responses, there
have been five negotiated rulemaking proceedings convened
under the auspices of the Montana Negotiated Rulemaking Act
(see Table 1). In three of the cases, the legislature mandated the
use of the formal negotiated rulemaking process. To date, 69
administrative rules have been promulgated as a result of
negotiated rulemaking.49 The 69 rules regulate the licensing
and management of game farms in Montana. Fifty of the rules
are new and 19 repeal existing rules. During this same five-
year period, a total of 10,307 administrative rules and
regulations were promulgated by Montana state agencies. Of
this total, nearly half, or 4,799 rules, focused on routine agency
matters, including the repeal of existing rules and the transfer
46. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-5-108(4) (1997).
47. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-5-108(5) (1997).
48. The Montana Consensus Council is a small state agency designed to promote
fair, effective, and efficient processes for building agreement on natural resources and
other public policy issues important to Montanans. It was created by executive order in
January 1994. The Council convenes collaborative problem solving forums; provides
consultation, education, and training; and conducts research and produces publications
to improve people's awareness, understanding, and ability to resolve complex, multi-
party public issues through collaboration and consensus building. For more information,
call (406) 444-2075.
49. Personal communication with the Office of the Secretary of State (December 9,
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of rules from one agency to another. In these situations,
negotiated rulemaking is probably not appropriate. It is not
clear how many of the remaining rules were challenged through
administrative or legal channels, or how many were adopted
with no opposition. 50
A. Reasons For Not Using Negotiated Rulemaking
When asked to explain why they have not engaged in a
formal negotiated rulemaking process, the departments replying
to the survey offered three primary responses.
First, several agencies rely on informal conferences and
consultations as a means of obtaining the viewpoints and advice
of interested persons with respect to contemplated rulemaking.
The departments explain that using these informal procedures,
encouraged in section 2-4-305, MCA, is consistent with the
intent of the Montana Negotiated Rulemaking Act.
For example, the Department of Agriculture replies, "We've
never found it necessary. If we anticipate controversy, we
automatically include the affected public during the formative
process... which seems to be de facto negotiated rulemaking."51
The Office of the State Auditor reinforces this observation in
stating, "Negotiated rulemaking merely adds formalities (e.g.,
publication of notice regarding committee appointment, use of a
facilitator, and so on) to regular rulemaking which informally
accomplishes the same end."52  The Department of
Administration says "We have not had a real controversial rule.
We do seek input from all constituencies prior to notice and
after. Mostly our rules reflect consensus now."53  And the
Department of Natural Resources and Conservation reiterates
"We generally solicit informal comments from constituent
50. According to the Secretary of State's office, the only way to document such
information is to contact the legal department of every state agency, a task that was
beyond the scope of this research project. A better understanding of the situations under
which administrative rules are appealed might give us a better sense of when negotiated
rulemaking might be a more effective approach to drafting administrative rules.
51. Survey response from the Department of Agriculture to the Questionnaire on
the Use of Negotiated Rulemaking (prepared and distributed by the Montana Consensus
Council, July 1998, on file with author).
52. Survey response from the Office of the State Auditor to the Questionnaire on
the Use of Negotiated Rulemaking (prepared and distributed by the Montana Consensus
Council, July 1998, on file with author).
53. Survey response from the Department of Administration to the Questionnaire
on the Use of Negotiated Rulemaking (prepared and distributed by the Montana
Consensus Council, July 1998, on file with author).
1999 509
11
McKinney: Negotiated Rulemaking: Involving Citizens in Public Decisions
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1999
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
groups prior to commencing formal rulemaking. In the recent
past, we have developed rules where the traditional process was
the most appropriate model to use. '5 4
Second, several departments find negotiated rulemaking too
cumbersome. For example, the Department of Labor and
Industry states "The act has a number of specific requirements
which are more cumbersome and costly than the department's
informal process. The department believes that its informal
negotiated rulemaking process tends to meet with the spirit and
intent of the act."55 The Public Service Commission echoes this
sentiment: "We find the negotiated rulemaking act extremely
cumbersome relative to what can be accomplished under the
Montana Administrative Procedure Act. The Public Service
Commission has engaged in numerous negotiated rulemakings
through the use of MCA 2-4-304, which involves a series of
informal comments on proposed rules prior to the formal round
of comments." 56
Third and finally, some departments have not used
negotiated rulemaking because the appropriate situation has
not emerged. For example, the Commissioner of Political
Practices says "We considered the procedure with regard to a
rule regarding lobbying and reportable expenditures. Since it
was a procedure mandated by a supreme court decision, it was
felt the normal procedure would be best."57 The Department of
Environmental Quality says "The appropriate situation has
never presented itself' and adds "the negotiated rulemaking
process still appears to be overly cumbersome and expensive."58
The Departments of Corrections and Transportation simply
found that "the occasion has never arisen."59
54. Survey response from the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation
to the Questionnaire on the Use of Negotiated Rulemaking (prepared and distributed by
the Montana Consensus Council, July 1998, on file with author).
55. Survey response from the Department of Labor and Industry to the
Questionnaire on the Use of Negotiated Rulemaking (prepared and distributed by the
Montana Consensus Council, July 1998, on file with author).
56. Survey response from the Public Service Commission to the Questionnaire on
the Use of Negotiated Rulemaking (prepared and distributed by the Montana Consensus
Council, July 1998, on file with author).
57. Survey response from the Commissioner on Political Practices to the
Questionnaire on the Use of Negotiated Rulemaking (prepared and distributed by the
Montana Consensus Council, July 1998, on file with author).
58. Survey response from the Department of Environmental Quality to the
Questionnaire on the Use of Negotiated Rulemaking (prepared and distributed by the
Montana Consensus Council, July 1998, on file with author).
59. Survey response from the Department of Transportation to the Questionnaire
510 Vol. 60
12
Montana Law Review, Vol. 60 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/6
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
These three reasons for not using negotiated rulemaking in
Montana are largely consistent with the conclusions of recent
studies on its use in Texas and at the federal level. In a recent
Texas study, the Center for Public Policy Disputes concluded
formal negotiated rulemaking has only been used three times by
Texas state agencies.6 0 The most frequently cited reason for not
using the process was the absence of an appropriate rule. Texas
state agencies also explained that they rely on the use of
informal conferences, consultations, and advisory committees to
advise the agency about contemplated rulemakings. 61 A final
reason for not using negotiated rulemaking is the costs to an
agency, in both time and money. In short, it appears that state
agencies in Texas feel much the same as state agencies in
Montana: there are many ways to involve citizens in the
rulemaking process, and given the costs associated with formal
negotiated rulemaking, it should be used sparingly.
At the federal level, Coglianese suggests the performance of
negotiated rulemaking has failed to surpass that of conventional
rulemaking for three reasons. 62 First, the process may actually
foster conflict stemming from determining membership on
committees, the consistency of final rules with negotiated
agreements, and the potential for heightened sensitivity to
adverse aspects of rules. Second, given that negotiated
rulemaking is designed to shape a proposed rule which is then
subject to the formal process of public review and comment, the
sponsoring agency may need to amend the proposed rule to
accommodate new interests or information. Such amendments
may require a retreat from the consensus proposal. Third and
finally, Coglianese argues that agencies and interest groups are
quite capable of working with each other in the context of
conventional rulemaking. Similar to the comments heard in
Montana and Texas, Coglianese says that "Negotiated
rulemaking shows weak results in large part because of the
strength of agencies in using less intensive methods of
negotiation and public input in the context of conventional
on the Use of Negotiated Rulemaking (prepared and distributed by the Montana
Consensus Council, July 1998, on file with author).
60. See CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY DISPUTE RESOLUTION, REPORT OF SURVEY
RESULTS OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION USE IN TEXAS STATE AGENCIES (January
1999).
61. See TEX. GOV'T. CODE ANN. § 2001.031 (authorizing the use of informal
conferences, consultations, and advisory committees by the Texas Administrative
Procedure Act).
62. See Coglianese, supra note 1, at 1321-1334.
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rulemaking. These methods, which include individual meetings,
public hearings, and ongoing advisory committees, provide
agencies with information about technical aspects of regulation
as well as the interests of affected parties."
Harter agrees that agencies may include citizens and
stakeholders in administrative rulemaking through a variety of
processes, including negotiated rulemaking. 63 He is emphatic,
however, that negotiated rulemaking should be reserved for
"highly complex, politicized rules-the very kind that stall
agencies when using traditional or conventional procedures."4
And, he persuasively argues that evaluating the performance of
negotiated rulemaking must be based on "what the agency itself
sought to accomplish" by using reg-neg.65 In other words, the
utility of negotiated rulemaking should not be diminished
because state or federal agencies rely on other methods to
involve citizens and stakeholders. The value of reg-neg should
be based on its core objectives-direct negotiations among
stakeholders, including the agencies, that result in
substantively better and more widely accepted rules.66 From
this perspective, Harter concludes, negotiated rulemaking "has
proven to be an enormously powerful tool in addressing highly
complex, politicized rules-the very kind that stall agencies
when using traditional or conventional procedures." 67 He goes
on to say that "Properly understood, reg-neg has been
remarkable in fulfilling its promise ... reg-neg cuts the time for
rulemaking by a third... and no rule that implements a
consensus reached by the committee has ever been challenged
substantively in judicial review."68
B. Interest in Future Use and Training
Although Montana state agencies seem cautious in
approaching negotiated rulemaking, when asked if they would
be interested in using the process in the future, 11 of the 19
agencies responding to the survey said yes; 3 said maybe; 4 said
63. See Philip J. Harter, The Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking: A
Response to Professor Coglianese (unpublished draft article on file with this author).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 13-15 (Harter presents the goals of negotiated rulemaking from the
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probably not; and 1 did not respond to the question.
The respondents cited several reasons for this interest. The
Commissioner of Political Practices said that "It may help
develop rules for complex situations that satisfy everyone's
needs and interests. In addition, the expenses associated with
resulting lawsuits may be avoided. '69 The Office of the State
Auditor explained that it would be interested in using
negotiated rulemaking if the parties affected by a proposed rule
suggested using the process.70 Many departments simply
explained that they would be interested under the "right
circumstances."
On the more critical side, some departments say that they
are not interested in using negotiated rulemaking unless value
above and beyond the informal consultation process can be
demonstrated. These departments feel strongly that the
informal consultation process is more flexible and therefore
more efficient and effective.
IV. THE PRACTICE IN MONTANA: CASE STUDIES
The five cases of negotiated rulemaking in Montana exhibit
some similarities and many differences. A summary of each
case is presented here, along with two other case studies, to
illustrate the place of negotiated rulemaking in the continuum
of approaches for involving citizens in administrative
rulemaking and to highlight lessons learned from Montana's
experience.
A. Formal Negotiated Rulemaking Processes
Game Farms: The existence of game farms-farms or
ranches that raise elk, deer, bison, and other wildlife-has
historically been contentious in Montana.71 The debates have
included emotional philosophical disagreements over ownership
of wildlife, a public resource, and the rights of private property
owners. They have also centered on practical issues, such as the
69. Survey response from the Commissioner of Political Practices to the
Questionnaire on the Use of Negotiated Rulemaking (prepared and distributed by the
Montana Consensus Council, July 1998, on file with author).
70. See Survey response from the Office of the State Auditor to the Questionnaire
on the Use of Negotiated Rulemaking (prepared and distributed by the Montana
Consensus Council, July 1998, on file with author).
71. Personal communication with Paul Sihler, Department of Fish, Wildlife and
Parks (April 30, 1999).
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potential transfer of disease from domesticated wildlife to wild
populations, theft of wildlife, and the potential hybridization
with undesirable species, such as the red deer.
After the 1993 legislature established a comprehensive
framework for regulating game farms, with responsibilities
shared between the departments of Livestock and Fish, Wildlife
and Parks, the "alternative livestock industry" tried during the
1995 legislative session to shift nearly all of the regulatory
responsibilities to the Department of Livestock, which is
presumably more sympathetic to the industry needs and
interests. The legislature did shift some of the responsibilities
that were more consistent with the expertise of the Department
of Livestock, and required the Department of Livestock and the
Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks to use the negotiated
rulemaking process to revise and update the administrative
rules governing the regulation of game farms in Montana.72
After a period of delay, the departments contracted with the
Montana Consensus Council in July 1996 to assess the situation
and to help the stakeholders design an appropriate process. The
results of the assessment indicated that representatives of six
stakeholder groups were willing to come together and, with the
help of the Consensus Council, seek agreement on rules to
govern the licensing and management of game farms. The
stakeholders-including representatives from the game farm
industry, livestock producers, hunters, sportsmen, and the two
departments-selected their own representatives and first met
in October 1996. This initial meeting focused on the ground
rules and a work plan to guide the negotiated rulemaking
process. Among other things, the ground rules specified that the
committee would make decisions by consensus, and that
consensus is, reached when all six stakeholder groups or
caucuses agree on a package of provisions that address the
issues being discussed. The ground rules also specified that
committee meetings were open and the public would be given an
opportunity to provide input and advice. Finally, the ground
rules stated that the Consensus Council would document the
results of each meeting and facilitate communication among the
participants during and between meetings.
The work plan outlined the issues to be addressed in the
negotiations and presented three goals or criteria for evaluating
proposed solutions: (1) the rules should serve the needs of the
72. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-4-422 (1997).
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game farm industry and should not unreasonably hinder
legitimate businesses from thriving, while also protecting
wildlife resources in Montana from any harm due to game farm
operations; (2) the rules should clarify the respective roles of
DFWP and DOL in regulating game farms; and (3) the rules
should be clear, specific, unambiguous, and readily
understandable by people owning and operating game farms,
DFWP and DOL personnel, and interested citizens.
The substantive negotiations began in an atmosphere of
distrust and frustration resulting from past regulatory and court
actions. The participants met for an entire day nearly every
month until May 1998. At that point, after 20 months of
negotiation, the participants reached agreement on 68 proposed
rules. The participants did not reach agreement on a rule
proposed by the DFWP on maintaining records. The committee
agreed to disagree on three other issues, and thus no rules were
proposed on these issues: (1) create another committee to
recommend alternative designs for appropriate game farm
fences; (2) use DNA testing to monitor and enforce game farm
animal thefts; and (3) test elk imported from outside Montana
for meningeal worm.
Based on the negotiated agreement, the participants then
spent 4 months seeking ratification of the proposed rules by
their constituents, drafting and redrafting the agreement into
the appropriate format for administrative rules, and resolving
disagreements that emerged during this first step of
implementation. Throughout this process, the Consensus
Council shuttled among the participants to clarify information
and interests, and to resolve disputes over specific language.
The draft administrative rules were eventually ratified by
the constituents of each stakeholder group, and DFWP and DOL
convened three public hearings in late fall 1998 on the proposed
rules. Very few people attended the hearings, and there was
essentially no opposition to the proposed rules. The
departments made a few minor, editorial changes to the rules
after the public hearings. Sixty-nine rules-the 68 agreed to by
the stakeholders and the 1 on maintaining records-were
adopted by the Board of Livestock in December 1998 and by the
Commission on Fish, Wildlife and Parks in January 1999. 73 The
adopted rules were published in the Montana Administrative
73. Personal communication with Paul Sihler, Department of Fish, Wildlife and
Parks (April 30, 1999).
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Rules on January 14, 1999.
Bed and Breakfast Establishments: Prior to 1997, bed
and breakfast establishments were not considered "public
accommodations" under Montana law. The Department of
Public Health and Human Services, however, required such
facilities to obtain a license under section 50-51-201, MCA,
which governs hotels, motels, and similar facilities. Before a
license can be issued by the department, it must be validated by
the local health officer or the sanitarian in the county where the
establishment is located.7 4 After certain bed and breakfast
operators complained about the inconsistent and unfair
application of these policies to their establishments, the issue
was raised at the legislature.
S.B. 118 required the department to "consult with bed and
breakfast operators" to develop rules to govern the operation of
bed and breakfast establishments.7 5 The rules may relate to
"construction, furnishings, housekeeping, personnel, sanitary
facilities and controls, water supply, sewerage and sewage
disposal systems, refuse collection and disposal, registration and
supervision, fire and life safety, food service ... staggered
license expiration dates, and reimbursement of local
governments for inspections and enforcement."76
The department began by reviewing the requirements of the
negotiated rulemaking act, and distributed a letter of intent to
initiate the process in August 1997. The letter was sent to trade
associations, interested parties, and groups known to have an
interest in bed and breakfast establishments. The letter
outlined a work plan and schedule, and requested suggestions
and comments from potential stakeholders. During September,
the department incorporated the comments it received, and
created a mailing list that included all known bed and breakfast
operators in Montana, trade associations, and other people
interested in the proposed rulemaking process.
In October, the department filed a notice in the Montana
Administrative Register to establish a negotiated rulemaking
committee on bed and breakfast establishments. The notice
specified that the department would accept applications and
nominations to serve on the committee. Then, in early
November, the department considered the responses and
74. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-51-201(3) (1997).
75. S.B. 118, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1997), codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-
51-108 (1997).
76. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-51-103 (1997).
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selected committee members to represent the bed and breakfast
industry and local health officials and sanitarians, who
historically work very well together.
Between January and May 1998, the committee met at least
once every month. The department facilitated the meetings,
prepared and distributed documents, and conducted research for
the committee. The committee worked diligently, and focused
on developing reasonable rules to govern different types and
sizes of bed and breakfast establishments. The committee
reached preliminary agreement on nearly every issue, and after
the meeting in May 1998, it prepared a proposed set of rules.
However, before the participants could ratify and complete this
step in the process, they agreed to recess for the summer tourist
season, the busiest time of year for bed and breakfast
establishments.
As of March 1999, the department had not reconvened the
bed and breakfast negotiated rulemaking committee. The delay
is largely due to time and resource constraints faced by the
department, as well as other priorities-such as other legislative
mandates to convene a negotiated rulemaking process on guest
ranches, outfitting, and guide services, and to create a one-stop
licensing process for new businesses. When it does reconvene
the committee, the department expects the participants to ratify
the agreements, translate the agreements into draft rules, and
then participate in the formal public hearings on the rules.77
Although the department believes that it could have produced
similar outcomes through the conventional rulemaking process,
it is impressed with the participant's support and ownership of
the negotiated rulemaking process and its outcomes.
Guest Ranches, Outfitters, and Guides: In 1997, the
Montana legislature also required the Department of Public
Health and Human Services to convene a negotiated rulemaking
process to develop rules governing the operation of guest
ranches and outfitting and guide facilities.78 This issue was
raised at the legislature for largely the same reasons as the
issue of bed and breakfast establishments; in the absence of
specific legal authority to regulate guest ranches and outfitting
and guide facilities, operators of such facilities perceived that
the department was applying existing policies in an inconsistent
77. Personal Interview with Staff, Department of Public Health and Human
Services, Helena, Montana (March 3, 1999).
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and unfair manner.
The legislature directed the department to develop rules "to
properly and reasonably address differences in the size, location,
purpose, and time of year of operation of certain small or
seasonal establishments .... (and that) rules governing...
(such) establishments must be limited to requirements meant to
ensure basic health standards and should not detract from the
rustic, out-of-doors experience offered by many guest ranches
and outfitter and guide facilities and desired by many
tourists."79
The department followed the same process for this issue as
it did for the negotiated rulemaking on bed and breakfast
establishments. It distributed a letter of intent in August 1997,
presented an initial work plan, collected names of interested
people, incorporated comments on the work plan, and
established the negotiated rulemaking committee in November
1997.
Starting in January 1998, the committee met at least once
every month through April. Apparently, the operators of guest
ranches and outfitter and guide facilities did not have the same
type of working relationship with local officials as the operators
of bed and breakfast facilities. The lack of trust between these
two parties made it very difficult for the committee to reach
consensus on any issue. The committee recessed for the summer
because of the busy tourist season, and has not been reconvened.
In response to their frustration with the. negotiated
rulemaking process, representatives of guest ranch and outfitter
and guide facilities supported legislation in the 1999 session to
determine when a guest ranch or outfitting and guide facility
meets the definition of a seasonal or small establishment.8 0 The
future of the negotiated rulemaking process is thus somewhat
dependent on what happens in the legislature. From the
department's perspective, the committee should meet again to
determine whether it should continue its search for consensus
or, consistent with the provisions of the negotiated rulemaking
act, submit a report to the director of the department outlining
areas of agreement and areas of disagreement.8 1 S.B. 338 is
clear: "The department shall adopt rules governing guest
79. MONT. CODE ANN. § 5051-102(2).
80. See S.B. 439, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1999).
81. Personal Interview with Staff, Department of Public Health and Human
Services, Helena, Montana (Mar. 3, 1999).
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ranches and outfitting and guide facilities." 2 Presumably, the
department must move forward and adopt such rules in spite of
the fact that the negotiated rulemaking process did not produce
a consensus proposal.
Wastewater Treatment System Design: Following a
series of intense discussions, the Montana Board of Professional
Engineers and Land Surveyors requested permission from the
director of the Department of Commerce to create a negotiated
rulemaking committee to propose rules on whether or not the
design and installation of wastewater treatment systems
requires a professional engineer's expertise and seal. With the
director's support, the department announced its intent to create
a negotiated rulemaking committee and received several
applications from interested people. The chairman of the board
then appointed a seven-member negotiated rulemaking
committee, including four members of the board-three of whom
were professional engineers and the fourth a public member; a
representative of the Montana Society of Engineers; a licensed
sanitarian; and one "qualified individual" certified by the
Montana Department of Environmental Quality.
The committee held two meetings, one in July and the other
in August 1998. Concerned members of the public attended and
participated in the meetings. The committee agreed that the
existing process used by the department to determine when
engineering services are required is appropriate. The committee
also agreed that the Department of Environmental Quality is
best suited to determine who is "qualified" to design wastewater
treatment systems that do not require the services of a
professional engineer. Based on these findings, the committee
unanimously recommended that the Department of
Environmental Quality develop a rule defining a "qualified
individual" for the purpose of designing wastewater treatment
systems and specify a certification process for such individuals;
refine the meaning of "complex wastewater treatment systems"
as used in the department's existing rules; and to solicit the
services of one person from the Board of Professional Engineers
and Land Surveyors, one person from the Board of Sanitarians,
and one person who is considered a "qualified individual" to
assist the department in preparing the new administrative
rules.
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In September 1998, the Department of Environmental
Quality agreed to the substantive recommendations of the
negotiated rulemaking committee, and said that it would "be
glad to provide a draft of our proposed rules for comment by the
three individuals which your committee selects," suggesting that
DEQ would draft the rule and then ask for input and advice.
DEQ said that it anticipates having rules ready for the formal
rulemaking process within six months.
Fire Suppression Systems Design and Installation: The
Department of Commerce convened another negotiated
rulemaking process in much the same way and at the same time
as the committee on wastewater treatment systems. The Board
of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, again with the
support of the department director, appointed a negotiated
rulemaking committee to investigate allegations that people who
were not professional engineers, but certified by the National
Institute for Certification in Engineering Technologies (NICET),
were designing fire suppression sprinkler systems. The
committee included three representatives of the national
institute, two fire protection engineers, and three members of
the board.
The committee met in July and August 1998. Members of
the general public and agency staff with technical and legal
expertise participated in the meetings. The committee learned
that the majority of sprinkler systems in Montana are designed
by people certified by NICET. To the degree that professional
engineers are involved, they simply stamp a plan as "sprinkler
as required," or words to that effect. Representatives from the
state fire marshal's office and the building codes division said
that people certified by NICET were competent to design many,
if not most, sprinkler systems in the state, and that they had
experienced very few problems with the work of such people.
The fire suppression engineers and one board member, however,
had some reservations about non-engineers designing sprinkler
systems that involve pumps, which are rare.
At the end of the two meetings, the committee offered a
series of consensus recommendations to the Board of
Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors. The
recommendations, which are pending adoption by the board,
clarify the type of sprinkler systems that can be designed by
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B. An Anomaly: Recreational Access to State School Trust
Lands 83
In addition to the five reg-negs convened under the auspices
of the negotiated rulemaking act, Montanans have engaged in at
least one informal, but rigorous and systematic process of
negotiating administrative rules. When Montana became a
state in 1889, the U.S. government set aside two sections of
every township to support public education. The Montana
Constitution requires the Land Board to manage these 5.2
million acres to maximize the financial return to the school
trust. The Department of Natural Resources and Conservation
leases most of these lands to farmers and ranchers. DNRC
allows lessees to manage the land, which has fostered feelings of
ownership and exclusive use among many lessees.
In the 1950s, recreationists argued that school trust lands
belong to the public and should be open to recreational use. A
multiple-use policy was written into state statutes in the 1970s,
but in 1979 the Land Board authorized lessees to deny hunting
access. In 1988, a coalition of recreationists filed suit against
DNRC and the Land Board to secure access to school trust
lands. DNRC tried to negotiate a settlement, but negotiations
broke down in 1990. The state district court recommended that
the parties address the issue through legislation. In response,
HB 778 was drafted and passed in the 1991 Legislature. The
bill allowed certain types of recreational use-hunting and
fishing-of state school trust lands and required recreationists
to buy a $5 license to compensate the trust.
In 1993, recreationists petitioned the Land Board to allow
other types of recreation in accordance with HB 778. The Land
Board voted to expand allowable uses to include not only
hunting and fishing, but also hiking, bird watching, and berry
picking. The lessees responded by closing nearly two million
acres of private land to recreationists. The closures occurred
during the peak of fall hunting season. The lessees believed
that in supporting HB 778 they had agreed to give up their right
to control access by hunters and anglers in return for
recreationists abandoning their request for expanded access.
The recreationists argued that the lessees never had a right to
control access.
In October 1993, the Land Board asked the lessees and
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recreationists to sit down and resolve the issue within 60 days.
The parties agreed and created an ad hoc committee composed
of four representatives each from the Montana Wildlife
Federation and the Montana Stockgrowers Association, and one
representative from the Montana Farm Bureau. The committee
then invited the Montana Consensus Council to convene and
facilitate negotiations.
In a series of meetings from November 1993 through
January 1994, the committee worked out agreements on key
provisions in the rules. The parties agreed that lessees could
condition or deny access to state land for selected management
reasons. They identified recreational uses that could cause
problems for lessees, including motorized vehicles, fires, pets,
horses, camping, and concentrated uses. The parties also
developed a process for resolving site-specific disputes, and they
agreed to a moratorium on any legislative, administrative, or
judicial activity to amend the agreement. They also agreed to
reconvene in December 1994 to assess these and other emerging
guidelines.
Throughout this process, the Consensus Council shuttled
between the parties, clarifying concerns, exploring options, and
documenting areas of agreement. It proved more difficult to
resolve the issue of when and how people should notify lessees
before recreating on leased land. The committee requested and
received an extension of the 60-day deadline, but the issue
remained unresolved when the committee submitted its
recommendations to the Land Board on January 18, 1994. The
board tentatively adopted the recommendations, tabling
consideration of the notification rules. DNRC and the
committee then revised the existing rules based on the
agreement, prepared an environmental assessment, and held
four public hearings on the proposed rules.
The Consensus Council again shuttled among the
participants to seek agreement on the notification issue. The
day before the Land Board's next meeting, the committee finally
agreed that recreationists should personally notify a lessee prior
to staying overnight, using horses, or discharging firearms on
leased land. If the lessee was unavailable, the recreationist
could leave a note in a drop-box at the lessees ranch.
Based on the agreement negotiated among the participants,
the Land Board adopted the revised rules on June 6, 1994. The
lessees gained increased control over access to leased land under
specified conditions. Recreationists gained increased access to
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state school trust land.
C. Informal Consultations
Montana can point to only a handful of cases that fall
directly under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, but many
agencies do rely on informal consultations to involve citizens and
stakeholders in the process of drafting administrative rules.
The experience of the Department of Labor and Industry seems
to be representative.8 4 The department says that it "has used an
informal version of negotiated rulemaking for a number of
years... [with] processes range from inviting representatives of
the interested parties to assist the department in the
development of rules (especially for new programs resulting
from recently adopted legislation) to seeking informal comments
from the interested parties on draft rules.8 5 The department
goes on to say that "obtaining comments from representatives of
the interested parties on draft rules allows [it] to address the
concerns of the interested parties... [and as] a result, in many
cases the version of the rules formally noticed for public
comment do not need significant changes prior to adoption."86
The Department of Corrections realized similar benefits
when it convened an advisory committee to redraft the
administrative rules licensing juvenile detention facilities.8 7
Due to the reorganization of state government in 1995 and
changes in the Youth Court Act, the department submitted a
notice of a public hearing on revised rules licensing juvenile
detention facilities in February 1998. However, the proposed
rules contained some clerical problems, and the rules had to be
republished. At the same time, the department received
comments from some people affected by the rules that additional
changes needed to be made. The department withdrew its
initial draft of the revised rules and, following a
recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Juvenile
Detention Standards and Administrative Rules, appointed a
committee of stakeholders from all areas of the state and parts
84. See survey response from the Department of Labor and Industry to the
Questionnaire on the Use of Negotiated Rulemaking (prepared and distributed by the
Montana Consensus Council, July 1998, on file with author).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See survey response from the Department of Corrections to the Questionnaire
on the Use of Negotiated Rulemaking (prepared and distributed by the Montana
Consensus Council, July 1998, on file with author).
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of the youth justice system. The advisory committee met a
number of times throughout the summer and fall of 1998.
A public hearing on the proposed rules was held in
November 1998. Four interested parties attended and
submitted both oral and written comments. Many members of
the advisory committee submitted written comments in support
of the process used to draft the proposed rules. The department
slightly modified some of the proposed rules based on public
input, and adopted the rules on January 4, 1999.
Reflecting on the process, the department says "It worked
very well. It brought together all the stakeholders in juvenile
detention licensing. As a result, the rules have been
thoughtfully revised by the people who use them, and we have
produced a set of rules that accommodate everyone's interests
and goals."88 The department goes on to say:
A notable, unplanned thing also happened during this process.
The stakeholders in juvenile detention facilities around the state
got to know each other much better, and.., most began to feel
more like colleagues within a system rather than separate entities
vying with each other. This process was time consuming and
work-intensive, but... our rules are more comprehensive,
responsive, current and accurate as a result of the advisory
committee process. Aside from ironing out some wrinkles, we
would definitely use this type of process again.8 9
V. DOES IT WORK? LESSONS LEARNED
How successful is Montana's experience with negotiated
rulemaking? And what lessons can be drawn from the state's
initial five years of experience? Before answering these
questions, it is important to acknowledge the ongoing dialogue
among scholars and practitioners over how to evaluate
consensus-building processes. How do we determine if a
particular project is successful? Based on what criteria? And
according to whom? 90
Montana's experience, placed within the context of what we
know about the performance of negotiated rulemaking at the
federal level and in other states, offers six lessons: (1) refine the
criteria and methods for evaluating consensus-building
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See generally David Fairman, Evaluating Consensus-Building Efforts:
According to Whom? And Based on What? CONSENSUS (Jan. 1999).
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processes, including reg-negs; (2) increase people's awareness
and understanding of the place of negotiated rulemaking within
the spectrum of approaches to involve citizens in administrative
rulemaking processes; (3) develop guidelines to help match the
most appropriate citizen involvement process to the situation;
(4) clarify the legislature's role in negotiated rulemaking; (5)
create incentives to use negotiated rulemaking; and (6) affirm
best practices for convening and managing negotiated
rulemaking proceedings.
A. Refine Evaluation Methods
What is a "successful" negotiated rulemaking or consensus-
building process? Although there is some disagreement among
scholars and practitioners, there also seems to be some emerging
agreement that there are multiple criteria or indicators of
success. 91  While different people may emphasize different
indicators, a comprehensive conceptual framework for
evaluation should integrate criteria focusing on outcomes, the
quality of the process, and the transformative value of the
process.92 The challenge is to not only include all of the relevant
91. For more information on evaluating consensus-building processes, see generally
WILLIAM L. URY, ET AL, GETTING DIsPUTEs RESOLVED (1989); GAIL BINGHAM, RESOLVING
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES (The Conservation Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1986);
LAWRENCE SUSSKIND AND JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE (1987);
FRANKLIN DUKES, RESOLVING PUBLIC CONFLICT (1996); ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH AND
JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH
EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994); and Judith Innes, Evaluating Consensus
Building (1998) (manuscript on file with author).
92. See MATTHEW McKINNEY, RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES: A HANDBOOK ON
BUILDING CONSENSUS (Montana Consensus Council, 1998). Here is one suggested
framework for evaluating not only consensus-building processes, but any public
involvement or dispute resolution process. (1) Outcomes: Was the issue resolved?
This is perhaps the first and most basic measure of success. Did all participants feel
they were successful in meeting their basic interests? It should be answered from the
perspective of all the affected people and organizations. Was the agreement
implemented? A second test of success is the extent to which the participants have
supported the agreement through the implementation process. If the parties have
voluntarily agreed to a decision, they are more likely to support it through
implementation. Was the agreement ratified by constituents, decision makers, and other
people whose support is necessary? What impact, if any, does the implemented
agreement have on-the-ground? Has it improved the situation? Did the process
really make a difference? How has the implemented agreement affected biophysical,
economic, and social systems? Are there unintended consequences? (2) Quality of the
Process: How fair was the process? Were all the groups who wanted to participate
given an adequate chance to do so? Was everyone given an opportunity to express his or
her views? Did each participant feel that the others accepted their concerns as
legitimate? Were all the parties given access to the technical information they needed?
Were the people involved accountable to the constituencies they ostensibly represented?
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indicators of success, but also to develop practical methods to
measure each indicator.
The Montana Consensus Council has recently developed
and tested one approach to evaluating success. Based on the
assumption that participants are in the best position to evaluate
the success of their negotiation efforts, the Council developed a
"Participant Satisfaction Scorecard." 93  The scorecard
incorporates 28 statements drawn from the growing body of
literature on evaluating consensus building processes. The
statements are grouped into three categories: outcomes, quality
of the process, and working relationships (or transformation).
For each statement, participants are asked to check a box
indicating whether that aspect of the process is important or
unimportant to them. They then indicate their level of
agreement with each statement by circling a number from 1
(completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). To date, the
Council has tested the scorecard in five different consensus
building forums, including the negotiated rulemaking on game
farms.
Was there a means whereby a due process complaint could be heard at the conclusion of
the negotiations? Were the gains and losses of various kinds fairly distributed among
the parties? Was there adequate opportunity for public review and comment? Was the
process open to public scrutiny? How efficient was the process? What were the
transaction costs-the time, money, and emotional energy expended-of the consensus
process compared to other processes that could have been used to address the issue?
How wise was the agreement? Was it based on the most relevant information? Did
the participants have an opportunity to jointly gather and interpret data and
information? Did the process foster an atmosphere of learning? Did the participants
consider a number of options on how to improve the situation? Is the agreement flexible
and adaptive to new information, interests, and ideas? Can the agreement be
implemented? Is it technically, financially, politically, culturally, and socially feasible?
How stable is the agreement? An agreement that is perceived as fair, is reached
efficiently, and seems technically wise is unsuccessful if it does not endure. Does the
agreement resolve the underlying problem, or is it simply another decision that fails to
stick. Was the agreement at least as good or better than the participant's best
alternative to a negotiated agreement? All things considered, could the participants
have gotten a better deal somewhere else? (3) Transformation: Sometimes, as part of
reaching an agreement, and sometimes in spite of "not" reaching an agreement, a
consensus process itself may be valuable. Did the process provide an opportunity for
developing and maintaining trust among people with diverse viewpoints? Were
communication channels created as a result of such processes? Would the participants
would be willing to renegotiate in appropriate circumstances? (Social capital). Did the
participants gain valuable insights about the issues and the perspectives and values of
others? (Intellectual capital). Did the process improve the ability of people,
organizations, communities, institutions, and society at large to solve complex, multi-
party issues? (Political capital).
93. See Will Harmon, Montana Group Tries Scorecard Approach, Consensus (Jan.
1999).
28
Montana Law Review, Vol. 60 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/6
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
Once the negotiated rulemaking process on game farms was
completed, the Montana Consensus Council distributed an
evaluation form to the participants. In sum, participants were
generally satisfied with the process, the working relationships in
the group, and the outcome. Interestingly, the evaluation
suggests that the participants were satisfied with the process
and the interactions at the table, but less so with the final
outcome. On average, people disagreed most of all with the
statement that the process was efficient, that is was time and
money well spent. On the other hand, a representative from
DOL said "negotiated rulemaking allowed us to build agreement
up-front, and thereby save time and money responding to the
inevitable challenges that emerge when we use the traditional
draft-notice-comment procedure. Negotiated rulemaking
works!" These somewhat contradictory conclusions emphasize
the importance of clarifying the expectations and objectives of
the convening agency and the stakeholders as a basis for
evaluating the success of negotiated rulemaking.
As the recent series of articles by Coglianese, Harter, and
Fairman demonstrate, there is clearly a need for scholars and
practitioners to continue developing multiple criteria for
evaluating consensus-building processes, and practical tools to
measure the criteria or indicators. The scorecard approach of
the Montana Consensus Council is one place to start. The initial
results from the use of the scorecard suggest that it should be
critically reviewed, refined, and further tested.
B. Increase Awareness and Understanding
Respondents to the survey in Montana concluded that we
need to improve people's awareness and understanding of the
intent, procedures, and appropriate use of negotiated
rulemaking. To foster the use of negotiated rulemaking in
appropriate situations, 15 of the 19 agencies responding to the
survey said that they would be interested in a short-course on
negotiated rulemaking. In addition to raising people's general
awareness and understanding of the negotiated rulemaking
process, the respondents suggested several ideas that might be
incorporated into an educational program:
* Compare and contrast formal negotiated rulemaking with
informal consultation - what are the relative strengths and
weaknesses of the different approaches?
* Acknowledge the range of possible benefits derived from
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negotiated rulemaking, such as better outcomes, increased
understanding of the issues, and improved working
relationships.94
" Highlight the experiences of agencies that have convened
negotiated rulemaking proceedings. What we can learn from
these experiences? What type of resources were involved in
convening such proceedings? Time, money, etc.
* Examine the role and value of relying on an impartial
facilitator or mediator to help convene and coordinate the
negotiated rulemaking. How do participants find and pay for
such services?
" Review the technical and procedural requirements to comply
with the statute. Clarify provisions that are advisory relative
to those that are mandatory.
" Discuss the principles of consensus building and the steps to
building agreement in the context of negotiated rulemaking.
Review tools and techniques for involving all affected parties.
* Provide criteria on when to use negotiated rulemaking.
* Conduct a role-playing exercise on negotiated rulemaking.
One person responding to the survey suggested that
negotiated rulemaking should be incorporated into the existing
class on administrative rulemaking, which is taught every two
years. Other people have suggested that such a short course
should be targeted to the eleven agencies that have expressed
interest in using negotiated rulemaking.
C. Match the Process to the Situation
Another lesson that emerges from Montana's experience is
that negotiated rulemaking is clearly not appropriate in all
situations. Of the more than 10,000 rules promulgated in the
past five years in Montana, 50 percent focus on routine agency
matters for which negotiated rulemaking is not appropriate.
Many agencies also conclude that negotiated rulemaking is
inappropriate when the informal consultation process outlined
94. In light of the Coglianese's article (see supra note 1) and Harter's response (see
supra note 8), there is a basic need to clarify the objectives and value of negotiated
rulemaking. Reg-neg provides another forum to foster citizen participation in public
decision making; allows for negotiation among stakeholders and the responsible agency;
potentially results in better informed and more widely supported rules and regulations;
may reduce litigation; may shorten rulemaking time. Negotiated rulemaking processes
may also result in "transformative" benefits even when they do not result in consensus
outcomes. The idea here is that negotiation and mediation often improve relationships
and people's understanding of each other and the issues even when the process falls
short of achieving unanimous agreement.
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in section 2-4-304, MCA, is sufficient to obtain the viewpoints
and advice of interested persons with respect to contemplated
rulemaking. Reflecting on their experience to date with the
negotiated rulemaking on bed and breakfast establishments, the
Department Public Health and Human Services concludes that
"[mlore than likely, we could have produced similar outcomes
through the conventional rulemaking process."95  The
department goes on to say, however, that "the conventional
process may not have resulted in the participant's support and
ownership of the negotiated rulemaking process and its
outcomes."9
6
Taken together, the different experiences with informal
consultations and negotiated rulemaking provide a useful
typology of approaches to citizen participation in administrative
rulemaking. From least intensive to most intensive, the
typology includes:
1. Seeking input and advice from citizens after
an initial draft of the rule is prepared but
before formal public hearing process;
2. Soliciting citizen input and advice prior to
preparing the initial draft of the rule;
3. Allowing stakeholders to work side-by-side
with agency officials and other stakeholders to
jointly prepare the initial draft; and
4. Engaging in a formal negotiated rulemaking
proceeding.
This typology suggests that agency officials should spend
some time assessing the rulemaking situation, and then seek to
match the appropriate process to a given situation.97
Conducting a situation assessment, usually with the assistance
of an impartial facilitator or mediator, is the cornerstone to an
effective negotiated rulemaking process. The likelihood of a
negotiated rulemaking process resulting in a consensus proposal
is contingent on resolving several key issues up-front: 1) who
95. Survey response to the Questionnaire on the Use of Negotiated Rulemaking
from the Department of Public Health and Human Services (prepared and distributed by
the Montana Consensus Council, July 1998, on file with author).
96. Id.
97. See Philip J. Harter and Charles Pou, Jr., Negotiating Environmental Policies:
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needs to be involved; 2) what is the appropriate role of the
agency; 3) what information is needed; 4) how shall such
information be acquired; and 5) what is meant by consensus?
Unclear goals and faulty stakeholder involvement limit the
ability of consensus processes to achieve their full power. When
consensus-building processes are hastily put together, without
adequate assessment or systematic consideration of the forum
design, participants sometimes feel "burned," "used," or that
their time has been wasted.
So, when is the use of a negotiated rulemaking process most
beneficial? As mentioned earlier, the Montana Negotiated
Rulemaking Act states that an agency director must determine
that the use of a reg-neg procedure is "in the public interest." In
making such a determination, the agency director is encouraged
to consider the need for the rule, the ability to identify
stakeholders and convene a balanced committee, the likelihood
of reaching consensus, the availability of resources, and the
agency's willingness to promote the committee's consensus
recommendation.
The literature on public dispute resolution suggests some
additional criteria for determining the best use of negotiated
rulemaking, or any other consensus-building process.98
Although there is some debate over the appropriate criteria to
consider in determining the "ripeness" of a situation for
consensus building, most scholars and practitioners agree to a
few basic tenets:
1. The proposed rulemaking is controversial.
Negotiated rulemaking is most useful if there is a history of
animosity among the stakeholders and the responsible agency;
the issue is politically-charged; the rule will be difficult to
enforce without voluntary compliance; or litigation is likely over
the resulting rule.
2. The outcome is genuinely in doubt. That is, there is
sufficient countervailing power-through political influence, a
commanding position of the facts, or other source-so that no
party is in a position to dictate the results. This analysis
assumes that you can identify the key stakeholders, their
98. For more on the appropriate use of consensus processes and negotiated
rulemaking in particular, see generally GERALD CORMICK, ET. AL., BUILDING CONSENSUS
FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE: PUTTING PRINCIPLES INTO PRACTICE (National Roundtable
on the Environment and the Economy, Ottawa, 1996); and JIM ARTHUR, A GUIDE TO
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interests, and resources, and conclude that the use of traditional
approaches to citizen involvement, including informal
consultations, are not likely to result in a widely supported
outcome.
3. The stakeholders share a common concern and
agree that the issue(s) must be resolved. They must agree
that there is a problem and a need for the rule, or at least
concede that a rule in some form will be adopted. This assumes
that the issues are relatively well-defined and compelling from
the perspective of the stakeholders. It also assumes that there
is some deadline for action, so that unless an outcome is
negotiated, someone else will impose a decision.
4. The stakeholders, including the responsible agency,
believe that a negotiated rulemaking process offers the
best opportunity to shape a fair, wise, and stable outcome.
This means that the stakeholders have a realistic understanding
of their "best alternative to a negotiated agreement" and
conclude that they are more likely to achieve their interests
through negotiated rulemaking than through some other
alternative forum.99 Another way to say this is that all the
parties believe that they have something to gain by negotiating
and something to lose by not negotiating. This principle
assumes that the stakeholders are relatively well-organized, can
select someone to represent their interests, and are willing to
invest the necessary time, money, and people to effectively
participate in the process. It also assumes that the situation
involves diverse issues, so the participants can trade on issues
they value differently. If the participants don't have anything to
trade, they are not likely to reach agreement.
5. The responsible agency is willing to participate and
implement a negotiated agreement. The agency must make
a serious commitment to the process by allocating staff time and
resources, and clearly communicating to the stakeholders that,
consistent with the formal public review and comment period, it
will seek to implement the negotiated rule.
These criteria or guidelines help define the best or most
appropriate use of negotiated rulemaking. 00 However, it should
99. An assessment of the best alternative to a negotiated agreement, or BATNA,
should include a consideration of transaction costs, the likely satisfaction with the
outcomes, the potential impact on relationships with other participants, and the stability
of the outcome.
100. In short, conventional citizen involvement processes work well for conventional
situations. Negotiated rulemaking should be reserved for unconventional, politically-
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be emphasized that Montana's experience to date suggests that
the basic idea of negotiated rulemaking can be effectively
adapted to different situations; situations where all of these
principles or necessary conditions are not satisfied. Although
the negotiated rulemaking on game farms consumed twenty
months, the Department of Commerce convened two short, very
focused negotiated rulemaking proceedings. The legislature has
mandated the use of negotiated rulemaking on three occasions
for complex issues. And the State Land Board encouraged
stakeholders to engage in an ad hoc negotiated rulemaking
process over issues related to recreational access to state school
trust land. Although this latter process was not convened under
the auspices of the Montana Negotiated Rulemaking Act, it is an
excellent example of how the theory of negotiated rulemaking
can work in practice.
When negotiated rulemaking is not appropriate, agencies
should seriously consider the pros and cons of other, less
intensive, approaches to citizen involvement. Whether agencies
simply provide information and education to citizens about a
proposed rule, seek their input and advice before, during, or
after the rule has been drafted, or convene an advisory
committee or working group to help draft the rule, they should
keep in mind a few guidelines. First, agencies should carefully
articulate their goals and expectations for any type of citizen
involvement process. They should clarify whether the process is
designed to identify issues and concerns, define problems and
opportunities, generate alternatives, refine options, or develop
recommendations. They should also make sure that citizens and
stakeholders understand that the agency reserves final decision-
making power.
The second tenet to citizen involvement in administrative
rulemaking is to be inclusive. Rather than consulting with a few
stakeholders, try to consult with all of them, or at least consider
the consequences of what may be perceived as biased, ex parte
communication. Third, realize that, if the stakeholders cannot
exert some control over the outcomes of the process, as in
negotiated rulemaking, they may have a limited incentive to
participate. Fourth and finally, realize that it will be difficult if
not impossible for the stakeholders to make trade-offs among
issues they value differently if they are not engaged in some
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D. Clarify the Legislature's Role
During the initial five years of Montana's experience with
negotiated rulemaking, it appears that the legislature is more
inclined to use reg-neg than state agencies. Why the legislature
mandates the use of negotiated rulemaking may be difficult to
assess. However, it is helpful at this point to reflect on the
appropriate role of the legislature in the process of negotiated
rulemaking.
As demonstrated by the case studies on guest ranches,
outfitters, and guides and game farms, it is difficult for the
legislature to mandate the use of negotiated rulemaking per se.
In the case of guest ranches, outfitters, and guides, neither the
legislature nor the department apparently assessed the
appropriateness of a negotiated rulemaking committee before
convening the process. This oversight may help explain the
gridlock encountered in that process. By contrast, the
departments of Livestock and Fish, Wildlife and Parks
completed an assessment up-front which, among other things,
demonstrated the willingness of stakeholders to participate in,
and help shape, a negotiated rulemaking process. Without
completing some type of systematic assessment, it is
presumptuous for the legislature or an agency to assume that
stakeholders or the responsible agency want to participate in a
reg-neg.
These examples suggest that it may be more appropriate for
the legislature to require state agencies to conduct an initial
issue, situation, or conflict assessment to determine if there is
sufficient value in convening a negotiated rulemaking process.
If a state agency completes such an assessment and concludes
that a negotiated rulemaking proceeding is not appropriate, the
agency should document the reasons for its decisions, explain
how it plans to proceed, and submit a report to the legislature
and other interested parties.10 1  As an alternative, the
legislature may ask its own staff, or an impartial third party, to
conduct the situation assessment. Either way, this approach
provides a reasonable role for the legislature to play in fostering
the use of negotiated rulemaking, holds the agency accountable,
and is more consistent with the principles and process of
convening a negotiated rulemaking proceeding.
101. This recommendation is consistent with Montana law which requires the
agency to notify stakeholders why it will not convene a negotiated rulemaking
committee. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-5-106(2) (1997).
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E. Create Incentives
In addition to increasing people's awareness and
understanding of negotiated rulemaking, and helping them
match the process to the situation, it may be possible to create
some incentives for agencies to consider the appropriate use of
reg-neg. For example, perhaps there are reasonable ways to
make the process less cumbersome, simpler, and more flexible.
Although many agencies claim that the negotiated rulemaking
act is too cumbersome, and are less likely to embrace the process
the more requirements there are, they need to remember that
the provisions in the act are advisory, not mandatory. 102 Agency
officials should adopt a more entrepreneurial spirit. It may be
possible, for example, to limit some of the formal public notice
requirements associated with the negotiated rulemaking process
if an adequate situation assessment is completed and a proposed
negotiated rulemaking committee is sufficiently inclusive of all
stakeholders. There may be other ways to stream line the start-
up of a negotiated rulemaking process.
Another incentive, consistent with fostering an
entrepreneurial spirit, is to allow citizens to request the use of a
negotiated rulemaking proceeding. 103 Apparently, this approach
is used, at least informally, by the U.S. EPA. Agencies are likely
to resist this type of strategy for fear that it removes some of
their authority and responsibility. Framed in a more positive
way, this strategy may demonstrate to agencies that certain
issues are controversial and very important to stakeholders. It
can serve as a type of reality-check. Once again, it is important
to remember that Montana's current negotiated rulemaking
statute allows the responsible agency to not initiate such a
process if it determines, through an assessment, that such a
process would not be feasible or useful. In other words, it may
be possible to envision a scenario where citizens ask a
responsible agency to consider the possibility of a negotiated
rulemaking process, and the agency concludes that such a
102. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-5-102 (1997) states that the procedures in the act are not
mandatory; they are simply advisory, and agencies and citizens are encouraged to
experiment with different approaches to negotiated rulemaking.
103. For example, in its survey response to the Questionnaire on the Use of
Negotiated Rulemaking, the Montana Office of the State Auditor said that it would be
more inclined to use a reg-neg process if the stakeholders suggested the use of that
process. Further, in an early draft of the proposed Montana River Recreation
Management Act of 1999, the authors suggested that negotiated rulemaking should be
initiated by affected recreational users or landowners within a particular watershed.
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process is not appropriate. While the agency may be criticized
for such a decision, it is also possible to use the assessment as
an opportunity to improve everyone's understanding of the
issue, build relationships, and seek agreement on another
appropriate process to address the issue. Finally, perhaps the
legislature could provide funding for one or more pilot projects,
or create some type of "Regulatory Reform Project" to promote
different ways to engage citizens in administrative rulemaking
with the goal of improving the substance and acceptability of
rules and regulations. In Washington, for example, the
legislature encouraged agencies to test the draft of a proposed
rule through the use of volunteer pilot study groups. 04 The
basic idea is to encourage citizens and stakeholders to help the
agency test the practicality of a proposed rule on a limited basis
before it is formally adopted and applied on a broader scale.
How well can the proposed rule be administered and at what
costs? Is it feasible for regulated communities to comply with
the rule? Answering these type of questions up-front can save
time and money that otherwise would be spent on appeals and
amendments to the rule.
F. Affirm Best Practices
Montana's experience with negotiated rulemaking
reinforces a number of practical lessons on designing and
managing consensus-building forums. To the extent practicable,
negotiated rulemaking processes should be voluntary, inclusive,
and participant designed. The negotiated rulemaking on game
farms and the one on recreational access to state school trust
lands were successful, at least in part, because the stakeholders
felt a compelling need to engage one another and agreed that
seeking consensus was the best approach to improve the
situation. The forums involved people affected by the issues,
those who may have undermined the process if not included,
and, at least in the case of game farms, those people needed to
implement the agreement. The stakeholders defined the issues
and the goals, and selected the participants.
By contrast, the experiences of the DPHHS suggest that it
may be difficult for the legislature to mandate the use of
negotiated rulemaking. Given the results of the negotiated
104. See WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.310 (2)(b). See also JIM ARTHUR, A GUIDE TO
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rulemaking process on guest ranches, outfitters, and guides, its
not clear that any of the stakeholders, nor the department, felt
compelled to engage in a consensus seeking process. It also
appears that very few, if any, of the stakeholders felt any
ownership in the process since it was largely designed by the
department. The different stakeholder groups were not given
the opportunity to select their own representatives, and
apparently had limited opportunity to define the issues and
objectives, set the agenda, and develop ground rules to govern
the negotiation.
The two cases from the Department of Commerce
demonstrate the critical importance of joint fact-finding and
mutual education. In both cases, the participants built a
common understanding of the issues, gathered and interpreted
data together, and shared information. The game farms and
recreational access cases also illustrate the value of this key
ingredient to a successful consensus-building process.
The case studies also demonstrate the need for
accountability; for participants to be accountable to each other
and the ground rules they adopt; for the representatives to be
accountable to the constituents they represent; and for all of the
participants to be accountable to the public and decision makers.
In most consensus-building processes, participants are
representing a constituency or group of like-minded people; they
are not simply representing their own views. Given this type of
arrangement, it is absolutely critical that the representatives
regularly inform their constituents and seek their input and
advice throughout the negotiation process. There must be
sufficient time for constituents to review, revise, and ratify a
final proposal. In the game farms case study, the
representatives and their constituents spent nearly four months
at this stage. However, that investment of time paid off during
the public hearings, when no one opposed the proposed rules.
The case study on recreational access to state school trust
lands illustrates the importance of keeping decision makers and
the public informed of the status of the negotiation. In this case,
the decision makers-the State Land Board-extended the
initial deadline of the negotiation based on the progress being
made.
Montana's experience with negotiated rulemaking also
reinforces the principle that the stakeholders must develop a
plan and stay involved during the implementation of a
negotiated agreement. Reaching an agreement through a
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negotiated rulemaking process is in some sense only the
beginning of the formal process; the proposed rule is then
subject to the formal public notice-and-comment procedure
during which objections may arise. The first task is to translate
the negotiated agreement into the appropriate format for
administrative rules. In the case studies on game farms and
recreational access, this process was sometimes difficult, but not
insurmountable, because the stakeholders were engaged and
held the agency officials accountable to the spirit and the letter
of the negotiated agreement. The second task is for the
participants, including the agency officials and the other
stakeholders, to jointly present the proposed rule to the general
public. In the recreational access case study, the participants
jointly presented the proposed rules during an informal open
house prior to the formal public hearing convened by the DNRC.
Largely because the stakeholders presented the results of the
negotiated rulemaking process and explained the rationale for
the outcomes, members of the general public-as peers-did not
raise any objections during the formal public hearings.
Finally, the role and value of an impartial facilitator or
mediator cannot be overlooked. In theory, a facilitator can help
assess the situation, provide negotiation training and advice on
process design, coordinate meetings, document agreements, and
support implementation. In the cases that were arguably the
most complex-game farms and recreational access-it is
doubtful whether the stakeholders would have made much
progress without the assistance of an experienced facilitator. On
the other hand, the experiences of the Department of Commerce
suggest that on issues that are more narrowly defined, with
fewer stakeholders, it is possible for the department and
individuals with recognized leadership skills to convene and
facilitate successful negotiated rulemaking processes. In
retrospect, the negotiated rulemaking cases convened by the
DPHHS would most likely have benefited from the advice and
consultation of an individual or organization experienced in
assessing public policy conflicts and helping stakeholders design
appropriate forums for seeking agreement.
VI. CONCLUSION
The use of negotiated rulemaking in Montana suggests a
couple of general lessons for the field of public dispute resolution
and consensus building. Consensus processes, including
negotiated rulemaking, are not a panacea; they are not
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appropriate in all circumstances. The basic challenge for
citizens, officials, and practitioners is to match the process to the
situation; that is, to understand when negotiated rulemaking
and other consensus-building processes are most appropriate, or
when another type of public involvement or dispute resolution
process might be more beneficial. The guidelines presented
above should help agency officials, citizens, and legislators
determine when negotiated rulemaking may be most
appropriate. The fact remains that negotiated rulemaking,
much like consensus building in general, is as much art as
science.
Another observation emerging from this study is that the
purpose and value of negotiated rulemaking is broader that
reducing litigation and the amount of time it takes to
promulgate administrative rules. These are admirable goals
and useful benchmarks to evaluate negotiated rulemaking.
However, it is also important to acknowledge the transformative
value of negotiated rulemaking, and the significant opportunity
it provides for a more deliberative approach to citizen
involvement in administrative rulemaking.105  When
appropriately used, negotiated rulemaking results in better
informed, more widely accepted rules and regulations.
Scholars, practitioners, public officials, and citizens should
keep in mind Harter's conclusion that this process is still in its
adolescence. The practice of negotiated rulemaking will most
likely become more consistent with the theory as agencies and
interest groups gain more experience and confidence with the
process. At the same time, the theory or expectations of this
rulemaking format should be adapted based on experience. As
suggested above, negotiated rulemaking should be considered
one option in a spectrum of ways to involve citizens in
administrative rulemaking.
Finally, to improve our understanding of the theory and
practice of negotiated rulemaking, it would be extremely helpful
to hear about the experiences of other states. How much is
negotiated rulemaking be used? What are the barriers? What
are the opportunities? Based on some additional systematic
research, it may be useful to convene a collective of state and
federal officials, scholars, practitioners, and others to examine
the past, present, and future of negotiated rulemaking as a
105. For more on deliberative approaches to public decision making, see DAVID
MATHEWS, POLITICS FOR PEOPLE (Univ. of Ill. Press, 1994).
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TABLE 1:
SUMMARY OF NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING CASES 1993-1998
Agency Project Date Mandated Facilitated Results
by the
Legislature
Livestock Game 1997 Yes Yes Consensus
and Fish, Farms & proposal.
Wildlife 1998 Sixty-nine
and Parks rules adopted.
Public Bed & 1997 Yes No Partial
Health & Breakfast & agreement.
Human Facilities 1998 Adoption
Services pending final
agency action.
Public Guest 1997 Yes No Partial
Health & Ranches, & agreement.
Human Outfitters 1998 Adoption
Services & Guides pending final
agency action.
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